Posts Tagged ‘philosophy’
Being all deep and stuff: Nicomachean Ethics Books III, VI, and VII
Book III discusses virtue as concerning feelings and actions. The actions are divided into voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary. Having established these definitions, Aristotle goes on to define decisions. Decisions are voluntary and typically are divided into the good and the bad unlike beliefs which are typically divided as either true or false. Decision is something that promotes a person’s wish. Since the process of deciding what action will best promote a particular end is deliberative all actions are voluntary for a human person. Therefore, achieving vice or virtue is freely decided by a person.
Since Book III establishes that there can be an ethic, Book VI discusses the soul and how it can work to achieve virtue. The soul is divided into two parts: the rational and irrational. There are also three capacities of the soul including perception, understanding, and desire. The end for each of the rational parts of the soul is truth and whatever end makes that part makes them grasp truth in the most effective way. To clarify, Aristotle explores intelligence (something that would best allow someone to grasp truth) and from this exploration he concludes that intelligence coupled with the good is a virtue. Furthermore, there are two types of virtue natural virtue and full virtue, and full virtue cannot be achieved without intelligence. Since the ethic requires a certain level of intelligence, this begs the question: what about all the stupid people in the world? Such an elitist, exclusive ethic seems misconstrued because it does not take into account all facets of humanity. The reader wonders how a person of lesser intelligence could achieve full virtue in Aristotle’s view. Maybe Aristotle would say that a person of lesser intelligence could be taught or shown the light (as in Plato’s allegory of the cave) in order to achieve full virtue.
In Book VII, Aristotle discusses the absence or deficiency of virtue namely encompassed in three ways: vice, incontinence, and beastliness. These explorations are difficult and Aristotle runs into many puzzles. Of particular concern is whether these people have knowledge of their wicked deeds or not. Incontinent people can act wickedly because they have an incompletely realized knowledge of their wickedness. These topics definitely need more development.
Being all deep and stuff: Plato’s Republic Book I
In this dialogue, Socrates converses with many people about what constitutes justice. The last person to put forward a definition of justice is the hot-headed Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus is a likable character insofar as he doesn’t roll over but presses Socrates creating a more engaging discussion and some entertaining heated exchanges of words. Thrasymachus asserts that the advantage of the stronger is just. Elaborating on this, he asserts that it is just to obey what a ruler orders. However, rulers can be fallible, and they can demand something that is in fact harmful to them. Therefore, the advantage of the stronger is no more just than what is not to his advantage. To avoid embarrassment, Thrasymachus claims that Socrates has born false witness to his arguments. This move is clever because it avoids having to respond to Socrates’ claims. Instead, the arguments are like two ships passing in the night. Socrates, however, is not easily dissuaded from argument, so the discussion continues. This time, Thrasymachus argues that injustice is “stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice” (344d). An argument that comes to mind that Socrates could use is from a Kantian, more universal perspective: If everyone is unjust than no one will have someone to rely on in his/her time of need. Additionally, if everyone is unjust then people will be constantly harming each other; whereas, if everyone is just to others people will be working for the benefit of each other. This argument would need to be further developed and does run into problems of its own (which may be why Socrates does not use it), but Socrates provides his own arsenal. Through questioning that leads Thrasymachus to make further claims. Socrates uses tautologies combined with the transitive property based on Thrasymachus’ previous claims to demonstrate that “a just person is like a clever and good one, and an unjust is like an ignorant and bad one” (350c). This causes Thrasymachus to be thoroughly embarrassed, and it drives the discussion in many directions. However, after it all, Socrates asserts that he knows nothing because he did not fully define justice before he explored his implications. Needless to say, this is not a convincing argumentative move, but that does not seem to be Socrates’ concern.
Being all deep and stuff: The Nature of Things
Philolaus states that: “It is necessary that things that are be all either limiters or unlimiteds, or both limiters and unlimiteds; but they could not always be unlimiteds only.” Looking at various examples in nature brings his proposition into question: Any living being has a finite life span and any cosmic object such as a star will cease being a star once the nuclear fission reactions stop. The conclusion must then be drawn that all things are limiters. However, organisms (limiters) can reproduce and create other organisms in the same way that a dead star can condense into a blackhole and then reignite into other stars in a Big Bang-like fashion. In this way, the species and stars can recreate themselves in an unlimited fashion. This reproduction of the objects does not mean that they are also unlimited. The future generations of a living objects or stars are markedly different. The basic elemental composition has remained constant, but the different arrangement results in different physiologies and personalities in the case of living beings and different nuclear fission processes in the case of stars.
On an unrelated note, Pythagoras said that numbers are essential for understanding the universe. In addition to the numerical ratios discussed that relate to harmonious sounds, Pythagoras was likely aware of the number 1.618, the so called golden ratio, that is prevalent in nature and relates to the human conception of ascetic beauty.
Being all deep and stuff: The Pluralists
Anaxagoras offers a more scientific metaphysical explanation of the universe than his predecessors, which could be considered progressive. Anaxagoras, however, seeks to explain the nature of things in abstract terms, and by doing so he experiences the same problem that past thinkers and future thinkers still try to address. The problem comes with Anaxagoras’ conception of the Mind. The Mind seems to be an organizing principle or god-like entity that is unlimited and stands alone. The Mind literally set things into motion, so that the combined elements rotated and eventually spun out becoming individual elements. Paramenides would clearly find fault with the Mind because the Mind cannot be observed, and Anaxagoras does not provide sufficient reasons to explain away that problem. Furthermore, Anaxagoras seems to be conceptualizing a Cartesian-esque world view that encompasses both the physical world and the ethereal world. Like Descartes who tried to claim that the pineal gland somehow manages this extraordinary phenomenon, Anaxagoras does not provide sufficient reasoning that explains how two different dimensions of existence could interact.
Empedocles provides a metaphysical conception of the universe that describes the basic elements of the universe that combine and are torn apart by the respective forces of Love and Strife. Besides later inspiring a righteous Captain Planet cartoon, Empedocles’ work brings new moral issues to focus. In fragment 62, Empedocles discusses a concept similar to the concept of reincarnation. According to this idea, anyone that commits murder will experience “difficult paths” throughout many lifetimes. Later in fragment 66, Empedocles states explicitly: “Fast from evil”. In this way, Empedocles has taken a progressive step in philosophy by expanding the metaphysical and epistemological discussion to include issues of morality.
Works Cited
In response to Joseph League’s conundrum about the firmest principle based on the fact that Aristotle says: “it is impossible for the same thing to both belong and not belong at the same time to the same thing in the same respect” it seems Aristotle would explain this with the idea of unqualified change. The object in question would not be the same thing in the same respect because its essence (meaning the compilation of material, formal, efficient, and final causes) has changed. In this way, Aristotle allows for change without contradiction because (be definition) the object is something entirely new.
Aristotle’s discussion of science brought up an interesting question of my own. For Aristotle, science must involve a discussion of substances and their causes as substances. The way to explore this phenomenon is through a science that takes into account both unity and plurality. A science studies being-ness of objects insofar as it studies substances and their attributes. The question is: when do we know and to what extent do we know to delve into the four causation questions? By this, I am wondering whether a working theory can be sufficiently be proven or disproven by the causation questions provided by Aristotle. In science, final cause is often ignored in order to explore more mechanical functions. Specifically, I’m thinking about the evolutionary perspective which seems to ignore the final cause issue. Or is there a final cause? In this instance, the final cause is species improvement. Such an idea seems to be similar to Aristotle’s idea of that each person strives to make the best of himself or herself; however, Aristotle’s idea is individual based while the evolutionary perspective is group based. I guess the point that can be gleaned from my unorganized presentation is that evolutionary science does not incorporate a final cause or at least one that is exactly like Aristotle’s; therefore, the question is: how would Aristotle incorporate the evolutionary perspective?
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